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THE MARKET MELTDOWN OF 2008 AND THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REREGULATION

In hindsight, most of us involved in the area of financial regulation look like we
were "Lotus Eaters."1 For almost twenty years, the reigning financial ideology
supported the belief that market participants and counterparties would effectively
police themselves; that the business cycle was over because new technologies and
global exchange had moved the economy to a new place; that professional reputation
was a superior proxy for legal enforcement; and that American-style, financial
capitalism was unqualifiedly the optimal form of economic organization. Both from
within and beyond the academy, and from the highest positions in government and
finance, the belief spread that developed capital markets and their participants were
mostly rational; that financial risk could be precisely quantified and "managed" to
the point of near irrelevance. We presumed that investment bankers and their hugely
leveraged firms, by manufacturing ever more complex, unregulated derivatives, were
creating real, new wealth, rather than compounding systemic risk. Conflicts of
interest that affected stock analysts, securities underwriters, auditors, credit rating
agencies, corporate law firms, mortgage lenders, compensation consultants, and
many "independent directors" at financial firms as well as operating companies were
ignored or downplayed by the law. The notion that the rich getting richer would
benefit everyone was accepted as common wisdom. The increased social acceptability
of massive personal and public debt seemed to promise benevolent, comprehensive
access to a utopian "ownership society."
Now to the present. We can barely calculate the scope of the losses that have
pummeled Wall Street and Main Street since 2007. Remarkably, a large swathe of
the high-finance community-after massive government aid-has regrouped,
restructured, and renewed its profitability. To appease a public stunned by "the bank
bailout," President Obama has floated a proposal to "tax the banks" 2-a proposal
that is probably unworkable in the age of globally mobile capital. As for Main Street,
we've taken to speaking of "the Great Recession."3 It seems that every day I meet
someone whose financial circumstances have been severely altered. Almost everyone
has substantially less savings, or worse, is scrambling just to get by; has lost a job, or
is supporting a previously working spouse. Social scientists have even reported an
increase in domestic abuse linked to the radically heightened financial stresses caused
4
by the recession.
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This Lotus-Eating period was not an especially enjoyable time to be a corporate
and securities law professor (like myself) who believes in an essential role for law and
regulation in maintaining robust capital markets and a healthy economy. Of course,
there were more than a few business law academicians who believed that the absence
of vigorous enforcement of corporate, securities, and banking laws was creating
overconfidence.' Many of my colleagues and other commentators shared my instinct
that the twenty-year process of financial deregulation reflected an ideological shift
more than anything like dependably welfare-enhancing economic transformation.6
Yet the financial markets continued their exuberant, unyielding climb right through
the fall of 2007-reigniting one of the longest bull markets in history. 7 Hence, this
frightened and unpleasant instinct was rarely articulated-not in the academy, the

government or media, and especially not in print.' The relative academic silence
partially reflected that this instinct was not readily susceptible to quantitative proof.
Thus, the true extent and peril of the compounding, financial risks were underanalyzed in the academic literature.
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A further contributing factor was that the most perilous forms of financial
transacting were occurring often in areas of the economy beyond the scope of
contemporary financial regulation. Hence, many of these transactions skipped
between the interstices of corporate, securities, banking, and insurance law. Naturally,
it is easier to critique the regulations that exist than the effects of absent regulation,
and easy to miss seeing the impact of gaps between multiple financial regulatory
structures. At a pedagogical level, the gaps and holes in this amalgamated regulatory
framework meant, also, that even a sincere, rigorous, politically "nonpartisan"
professor of business law could teach a full course load without addressing his or her
students (or peers) about the increasingly dangerous alchemy of compounding
financial risk, increased leverage, and deregulation.
For the last three years, the Treasury and Federal Reserve, Wall Street's brightest,
the academy, and the media have all been playing catch up. We are attempting to
bring into focus what happened and what must happen, in terms of institutional and
law reforms, to avoid further disaster. In this effort, of course, a central question has
been the appropriate role of law in governing the capital markets and financial
transacting. The House of Representatives passed a comprehensive set of financial
reforms in the fall of 2009. 9 But the outcome of Senate efforts remains indefinite.
Most recently, in mid-March 2010, Senator Chris Dodd promised that a tougher
version of financial regulatory controls would emerge from the Senate Banking
Committee. 10 Nevertheless, as of the time this issue is published, Republican Senators
stand opposed and promise a fight."i Certainly the breadth of the proposed reformsreforms that address mortgage lending, consumer credit practices, derivatives
oversight, executive pay, shareholders' voting, banks' capital requirements, and the
"too big to fail" phenomenon 12-present a challenge to the passage of legislation.
This question-the appropriate role of law and regulation in governing the
financial and capital markets-was the fundamental question around which we
organized a symposium at New York Law School on April 24, 2009. Entitled "Fear,
Fraud, and the Future of Financial Regulation," the symposium was the second
sponsored by the law school's Center on Business Law and Policy. The papers
published in this symposium issue of the Law Review reflect the breadth of that
day's program. I will comment briefly on each of the papers published herein.
9.
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Stability Act of 2010, S. 111th Cong. (as re-introduced by Senator Chris Dodd on March 15, 2010, and
reported out of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on March 22, 2010).
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As Professors Merritt Fox, Lawrence Glosten, and Paul Tetlock note in the
introduction to their article, there have been few subjects as perplexing for regulators
as short selling.13 In the most intense moments of the financial crisis in the fall of
2008, shorting became a great concern in relation to the destruction of confidence,
and hence value, in financial firms. 14 Selling short has the potential to improve
liquidity and price accuracy and to limit bubbles, and these are all socially beneficial
effects. But shorting also may encourage the spreading of harmful, value-destroying
rumors, facilitate coordinated efforts at market manipulation (through bear raids, for
example), and hence decrease investors' confidence in the fairness of the market. As
the authors note, there are legitimate concerns about illegal insider trading in regard
to a substantial percentage of short selling. For this reason, and because the volume
of short selling is a substantial proportion of all equity trading, much is at stake in
Congress's or the SEC's decision to impose, or not to impose, limits on short
selling-for example, whether the "uptick rule" should be restored.
Along with his co-authors, Fox surveys various theories regarding shorting's
effects, the history of Congress's and the SEC's treatment of shorting, and newly
emergent empirical studies seeking to illuminate the circumstances motivating the
most common patterns of short selling. In their article, Fox and his co-authors make
a new contribution to the empirical literature by studying the association between
above-normal levels of shorting and the next-day release of negative news about
listed issuers (that is, news reported in the media). The technical apparatus for
effectuating this study is itself quite a feat. The study concludes that a substantial
portion of all short selling is driven by (i) the seller's having obtained material,
nonpublic, negative news about the issuer; or (ii) the seller's having shorted and then
spread false negative news about the issuer; or (iii) the seller's having shorted and
then spread true negative news about the issuer (i.e., information that represented his
or her independently arrived-at conclusions based on already public data). As the
authors note, these conclusions need reinforcement by further empirical study. The
existing empirical studies present neither a conclusively positive nor conclusively
negative picture of shorting. Hence they do not lend themselves to easy policy
prescriptions.
As if the Commission had taken to heart Fox and his co-authors' mixed
conclusions, in February 2010 the SEC determined to enforce certain narrow pricebased constraints on selling short. In a 3-2 vote along partisan lines (with Democrats
in the majority), the SEC resolved to reestablish both a price test and a circuit breaker
on short selling (the former being an alternative version of an uptick rule). 5 At the
same time, the Commission deliberately chose to avoid imposing any bright-line
proscriptions on short selling, noting that many commentators on the proposed rule
13.

Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul C. Tetlock, Short Selling and the News: A Preliminary
Report on an EmpiricalStudy, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 645 (2009/10).
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Dealbook, S.E.C. Halts Short Sales of FinancialStocks, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/
us-and-britain-move-to-ban-short-sales-of-financial-firms/?emc=etal (Sept. 19, 2008, 07:11 EST).
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had highlighted the potentially salutary effects of shorting (consistent with Fox,
Glosten, and Tetlock's conclusions). In the end, the SEC's adopting release
emphasized the importance of maintaining investor confidence via clear, enforceable
financial regulations-in particular, enhancing investors' faith that the SEC would
act to minimize extreme volatility and coordinated efforts at market manipulation.16
In conclusion, the challenge of determining the appropriate approach to regulating
short selling illustrates the enormous regulatory and political challenge before
Congress and other financial regulators.
Professor Houman Shadab's article tackles a different area of finance and
financial regulation. The crisis, as we all know now, was linked to the mispricing of
the risk attached to mortgage-backed and other asset-backed securities (which were
tied to mistaken assumptions about real estate values, inter alia). Professor Shadab's
article analyzes the related but distinct phenomenon of credit default swaps
("CDSs").17 These CDSs were used both in hedging strategies on bond portfolios
and in speculating. Where used as bond insurance, the CDSs were only as good as
the creditworthiness of their issuers. In this vein, Shadab explains certain of the
vulnerabilities in CDSs that would have bankrupted AIG and shaken bank asset
portfolios to the core. As he describes it, a combination of agency costs (for example,
gaps between individual CDS sellers' compensation and the risk carried by the seller
institution), inaccurate assumptions (for example, overreliance on credit ratings in
valuing asset-backed securities), institutional infirmities (including looser, more
inchoate bank capital requirements), lassitude in counterparties' risk monitoring, and
even banks' "gaming" of moral hazard all fueled the coming disaster. These hazards
were compounded by the absence of governmental oversight in the market for CDSs
and, even, the absence of a central clearinghouse or other self-regulatory, oversight
body.
Beyond providing a breathtakingly clear roadmap through an area of finance so
complex that many bankers appeared to have been caught unawares, Shadab's article
raises a fundamental question about the nature of what counts as "regulation." Most
fundamentally, can bilateral, readily enforceable, and market-adjusting counterparty
commitments operate as effective and lesser-cost surrogates for government-imposed
standards and oversight? Can these private, contractual understandings be considered
an alternative, meaningful form of "regulation?" Or, is the very use of the term "selfregulation" as it relates to counterparty monitoring in credit derivatives (and
otherwise) a loaded, normative judgment about the limits of law?
Following on the themes identified by Professors Fox and Shadab, Professor
Steven Schwarcz's article opens with the insight that "[f]inancial market failures can

16.

Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Approves Short Selling Restrictions (Feb. 24, 2010),

http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-26.htm; Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act
Release No. 34, 61595, 75, Fed. Reg. 11,231 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
17.

Houman B. Shadab, Counterparty Regulation and Its Limits: The Evolution of the Credit Default Swaps
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be attributed in large part to three causes: conflicts, complacency, and complexity." 8
Schwarcz focuses on the problem of ambiguity facing trustees in securitizations,
bond issues, and other issuances of debt securities. In cases of financial distress,
where a default has occurred or is imminent, these financial structures generate
conflicts among the multiple classes of investors therein-investors who are likely to
have incompatible financial rights and expectations. Schwarcz offers the examples of
senior and subordinated bond investors, and investors who hold claims on the
"interest only" or "principal only" tranches of securitized debt.
The importance of developing better legal guidance for addressing the "conflicted
trustee dilemma" is one of the lessons emerging from the financial crisis. As Schwarcz
notes, it is remarkable that precise legal direction for trustees faced with resolving
these conflicts generally appears nowhere in the relevant contracts, case law, or even
model acts or restatements.
One fascinating thing here is the analogy Schwarcz draws between the problems
facing "conflicted" trustees on debt securities and the potentially conflicting duties
facing directors of corporate boards. These contexts include corporate transactions
proposed by controlling shareholders and transactions undertaken during the
company's insolvency (or near insolvency). In the former setting, corporate law's
"entire fairness" standard has not offered sufficiently clear advice to the conflicted
corporate board or special committee.19 The corporate fiduciary case law addressing
the obligations, if not the potential liability, of the boards of insolvent or nearinsolvent firms has been similarly murky.2 Schwarcz's article offers several potential
routes to limiting the confusion, or at least the potential liability, facing trustees on
debt securities. Such guidance might also be relevant to corporate boards in the
21
scenarios identified above.
Picking up on the theme of complexity, Professor Eric Pan's article surveys the
confusing doctrinal evolution of the "duty to monitor."2 2 As he notes, corporate
boards' duty to monitor their corporations' affairs has been variously interpreted as a
stand-alone duty, a facet of the duty of care, a dimension of the duty of good faith,
and a subset of the duty of loyalty. Of course, each of these iterations of directors'
fiduciary duties implies different burdens of proof and different potential liability
18.

Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: The Conflicted Trustee Dilemma, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 707

(2009/10).
19.

For a discussion of the case law applying the entire fairness standard to transactions proposed by
controlling shareholders, see Faith Stevelman, Going Private at the Intersectionofthe Market andthe Law,
62 Bus. LAW. 775 (2007).

20. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007); Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., CV No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS
215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); D.J. Baker, John Wm.Butler, Jr. & Mark A. McDermott, Corporate
Governance of Troubled Companies and the Role of Restructuring Counsel, 63 Bus. LAW. 855 (2008);
Stephen Fraidin & Faith Stevelman, Duties to Bondholders in Recapitalizationsand Restructurings, 754

PLI/CoRP. 277, 297-318 (1991).
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Eric J. Pan, A Board's Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 717 (2009/10).
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exposure. For example, the company's charter exculpation clause, insurance, and
indemnification provisions would apply differently depending on which duty was
implicated. After careful explication of the most recent cases addressing the duty to
monitor and the duty of good faith, Pan concludes that Delaware has expunged the
duty to monitor as a distinct legal obligation of corporate boards. He notes how this
judicial result creates a conflict with section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law, which provides that "corporate affairs must be managed by or under the
direction of the corporate board."23
Pan also observes the tension between Delaware's laxity vis--vis boards'
monitoring duties and certain federal court cases interpreting directors' liability for
faulty corporate reporting. Finally, Pan notes, Delaware's narrow reading of boards'
duty to monitor flies in the face of increasing and widespread calls (for example,
from the influential Treadway Commission) for enhancing boards' responsibilities
for risk management-calls that have only become more urgent in the wake of the
financial crisis. 2 4 In sum, the first state of corporate law appears to have effectuated
its own, unique form of "equitable" deregulation.
Pan concludes, rightly, that in electing virtually to eliminate directors' liability
for failures of risk management, Delaware has created greater risk of loss for
shareholders and other constituencies, especially in the case of financial firms. One
wonders how far Delaware can play the hand of avoiding the toughest issues in
corporate governance (and placating corporate managers, who select the state of
incorporation) while maintaining the widespread respect of investors and corporate
legal academicians. Certainly, the financial crisis has raised the stakes of Delaware's
deregulatory gamble.
Against the background of the financial crisis, fraudulent market practices, and
populist expressions of outrage, Professor Celia Taylor interrogates a commonly
shared anxiety-asking whether the very nature of the corporate form of organization
encourages "greed and inequity."2 Accordingly, Taylor surveys the opposing
intellectual constructs of shareholder valuism and corporate social responsibility.
Then, in precise detail, she analyzes several recent innovations in business structures
targeted at promoting not just capital formation, but also broader social welfare goals.
Of these, the "B corporation" is the most widely known. But what is remarkable, as
Taylor illuminates, is the variety, number, and varied origins of these many structural
innovations targeted at the public interest. Taken together, Taylor observes, these
structural innovations are challenging the conventional dividing line between forprofit and non-profit business structures. Hence, as Professor Taylor argues, we must
"carpe crisis" to think creatively about the relationship between commerce, business
structure, and the common good.
23.
24.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
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Much has been learned in the nearly two-and-a-half years since the beginning of
the financial crisis. Academic conferences like the one held at New York Law School
in April 2009 have contributed to this process, providing fresh data and fresh insights.
The challenge before us is whether we can find a better equilibrium between enabling
financial transacting and empowering government to circumscribe abuse-a question
that will no doubt catalyze significant political partisanship, as well as academic
debate.
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